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Italy’s education system has been evolv-
ing since 1877, when Italian law declared that
elementary education was compulsory for all
children aged six to nine, and Italy began pro-
viding free non-secular schooling. Michele
Coppino, the minister of public education from
1876 to 1878, declared that a country that
could force its citizens to go to war could also
enforce mandatory schooling for its children.
From this point onward, the struggle for con-
trol over the Italian schools has been intense.
In 1922, Benito Mussolini gained control of
Italy’s schools and vacillated between trans-
forming all of them into Montessori institu-
tions and declaring Montessori education ille-
gal and enforcing a stringently controlled
system of education filled with fascist propa-
ganda. The changes to the education system
that occurred during Mussolini’s reign are
commonly called the Gentile reforms, named
after his Minister of Public Education Giovanni
Gentile, who declared in 1924 that the entire
school system should be run by the govern-
ment. In 1944, with the collapse of fascism in
Italy, the government established a more
democratic control of the school system, but
still retained a large degree of power. (“Italy”)
Every attempt at enacting significant educa-
tional reform has failed since these changes
and the changes listed in the Italian
Constitution in 1947.
Today, Italy needs to drastically change its
educational system. The current system of ele-
mentary education is antiquated and overbur-
dened. In this article, I analyze the problems
affecting elementary education in Italy. I detail
both the successful and failed reforms of the
past and explain why most past proposals have
failed. I also address how proposed reforms
would affect the school system and the coun-
try. Finally, I investigate the probable outcomes
of the current reforms, report the public’s reac-
tion to proposed changes and provide sugges-
tions for future changes to the system of Italian
elementary education. 
On the basis of my research I conclude
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that the transitory nature of the Italian gov-
ernment makes it impossible for a compre-
hensive, all-encompassing set of reforms to be
successfully instituted in the educational sys-
tem. Instead, ministers of education should
focus on the most critical weaknesses of Italian
elementary education and implement smaller
piecemeal reforms to accommodate specific
needs.
Italian Education Today
Demographically, the face of Italian edu-
cation has been significantly shifting in recent
years. Only 10% of the current population is
between ages 5 and 14, the ages school atten-
dance is compulsory for Italian children (com-
pared with 15% of the American population).
(Education at a Glance, 2001) Indeed, Italy has
the lowest percentage of children in this age
range of all the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries. Moreover, this number is expected to
decrease by a further 11% over the next ten
years. These low numbers can be attributed to
the drop in Italy’s birthrate that began in the
1980s and still continues. The birthrate in 1980
was 2.2 children per household and declined to
1.19 by 1998; it has continued to dwindle caus-
ing a “...conspicuous decrease of the young
population, in particular at pre-primary, pri-
mary and lower secondary age.” (“UNESCO
Country Reports”) This shift in demographics
has had serious repercussions in Italy’s schools. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the diminished stu-
dent population and the effects that lowered
enrollment has had on the Italian school sys-
tem: teachers laid off and schools closed.
Between 1990 and 1997 alone, 16,000 schools
closed, representing 38% of all of Italy’s pri-
mary, lower secondary and upper secondary
schools. During that time, 57,000 teachers lost
their jobs. (“UNESCO Country Reports”) 
Throughout the school closings and fac-
ulty firings, Italy has maintained a steady pri-
mary school teacher–student ratio of 3:11.
During the past decade, Italy also has increased
its per-pupil expenditure from $4,430 per stu-
dent in 1994 to $5,653 in 1998. (Education at
a Glance, 1997; Education at a Glance, 2001)
Despite spending and a desirable teacher–stu-
dent ratio, the performance of Italy’s primary
school students has continued to decline.
According to the Third International
Mathematics and Science study (1999), Italian
student achievement in these areas was signif-
icantly below the norm, ranking last of the 12
OECD countries measured. Italy scored 485 on
math (43 points below the OECD country
mean) and 498 on science (36 points below the
OECD country mean). Even more troubling,
these scores were significantly worse than the
last time Italy participated in this test in 1995.
(Education at a Glance, 2001)
Past Reforms
Faced with closing schools and diminish-
ing test scores in math and science, successive
governments have argued for drastic changes
to the Italian public education system. Despite
repeated efforts, educational reforms have had
a difficult time being enacted in Italy because
of the transitory nature of the Italian govern-
ments: “...there has been no thorough overhaul
of the education system since the 1920’s caus-
ing an extraordinary accumulation of unre-
solved issues and problems.” (Reviews of
National...) Since 1948, Italy has had 30 dif-
ferent ministers of public education serving
under 45 different governments. (Reviews of
National...) The instability of the Italian gov-
ernment has depressing implications for the
future of education reform and has led to frus-
trating consequences of attempted reforms of
the past. With governments constantly chang-
ing and continually canceling the work of their
predecessors, it has been nearly impossible to
produce any significant or lasting changes or
to enact a reform that has been approved. 
Former Minister of Public Education
Luigi Berlinguer had drafted and sponsored a
reform that would change the composition of
the elementary and secondary school. His
reform combined the eight years of elementary
and lower secondary school into a seven-year
“basic school.” The new schooling program
began at the age of 3, with 3 years of pre-pri-
mary education; then, from ages 6 to 13, the
student would attend 7 years of basic school-
ing; and between the ages of 13 and 18, the stu-
dent would attend 5 years of secondary school.
(“UNESCO Country Reports”) This reconsti-
tuted school system would have lowered the
graduation age to 18, which is in line with EU
norms, and increased the length of compulso-
ry secondary schooling to two years. In
February 2001, the school reform laws were
finally approved after years of political deliber-
ation; they were to be enacted in the
2001–2002 school year. (“Government
Halts...”) Figure 2 illustrates the system of
Italian education as it currently exists and as
conceived in Berlinguer’s reforms. 
But, like the reforms of his predecessors,
Berlinguer’s were quickly overturned by a new
government. Elections held on May 13, 2001,
halted the reforms drafted by the previous gov-
ernment. A party shift caused by the election
placed the center right in power and the newly
appointed Minister of Public Education, Letizia
Moratti, began researching her own reorgani-
zation scheme, rejecting the reforms that
Berlinguer had worked so diligently to get
approved during his term in office. 
Although overturning Berlinguer’s
reforms was significant, it was not a surprise.
None of the Italian ministers of education since
Gentile (1924) have been able to enact their
entire proposed system of reforms. But this
does not mean no changes have been made to
the school system in the past 80 years. Some
ministers of public education, while having
their large-scale reforms rejected, have been
able to initiate small changes. These partial
reforms and slight changes have contributed
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to the public’s opinion that the Ministry of
Education is capable only of tinkering with the
system, but this may not be the case. Although
former minister Berlinguer was unable to insti-
tute the entirety of his educational reforms, he
was able to pass the Bassanini Act (1997),
which has had significant influence on the cur-
rent system of Italian education as a whole. The
Bassanini Act focuses on decentralizing the
Italian system of education and granting each
school a degree of autonomy. 
Italy’s schools are as diverse as its popu-
lation, with rural schools facing problems that
do not trouble their urban counterparts. Yet
each of these schools for many years was held
to the same rigid national standards. The
Bassanini Act sought to increase the flexibility
of the national school system by decentraliz-
ing and granting school autonomy. According
to this law, “all the administrative functions
and responsibilities concerning their respec-
tive districts at present carried out by any insti-
tution or administration of the State whether
central or peripheral or through other public
authorities or bodies will be transferred to the
regions and local authorities.” (“The Italian
Education Profile”)  
The Bassanini Act allows local schools to
evaluate their community’s problems and focus
curricula and resources to fix them. This
enables distributing resources in ways that best
meet local needs. Autonomy and decentraliza-
tion create elasticity in the school system,
something that the Italian Ministry of
Education views as a great strength: “the best
idea in the Italian school system is its flexibil-
ity.” (De Gasperis) Other influential interna-
tional agencies such as the government of
Scotland and OECD have strongly praised the
benefits of school autonomy: “Our view of
autonomy is that it will become the corner-
stone of school improvement; that it will shift
the focus of teachers, principals and others
involved in education away from laws that
define inputs, that is class size, school organi-
zation, teaching hours, to a focus on bench-
marks to decide appropriate learning outcomes
for students in schools.” (“QUALS”; Reviews of
National...)
Following 50 years of debate, Berlinguer
passed another reform in 2000, finally estab-
lishing school parity. This new law recognizes
private schools as equal to public schools, if
they conform to set standards: “Private schools
can now enter the national teaching system
with full freedom of method and focus.” (“The
Italian Education Profile”) The standards
include accepting all students, including those
with disabilities; conforming to the govern-
ment’s established educational program; and
Figure 2
The Italian School System, at Present and According to the 
1999 Proposed Reform
School System at Present
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agreeing to evaluations by governmental agen-
cies. (“The Italian Education Profile”) 
Current Education Reforms
Establishing autonomy and school parity
has changed the structure of Italian schools,
but these two small reforms do not fix all the
problems the system is facing. It is the larger
problems of decreased enrollment, student
achievement and ages of school attendance that
have been featured in various forms in many
different reform plans over the past decade.
These are the issues that Berlinguer had hoped
to address with his overturned reforms, and
these are the focus of Moratti’s current reor-
ganization scheme. 
Moratti is proposing a comprehensive,
highly political and highly contested set of
reforms. Whereas some say these reforms are
aimed at bringing Italy’s schools in line with
EU standards, others believe they are simply
destructive and should not occur: “Letizia
Moratti, the education minister, has advanced
a reform bill that takes resources away from
state schooling; for the average pupil this will
mean fewer years in high school, fewer teach-
ers and increased workloads for remaining
staff.” (“School”)
Moratti has based her reforms on the sug-
gestions of the Bertagna Commission, a group
she formed of education professionals who
scrutinized the educational system and pro-
posed solutions. The result was the Bertagna
Draft, upon which the new legislation was
based. (Visco)  Similar to Berlinguer’s reforms,
the Bertagna Draft aimed to lower the gradua-
tion age of Italian students to eighteen. It sug-
gested reducing the number of years that
Italian students spend in secondary school
from five to four. However, Moratti, in her final
proposal, retains the five-year upper-secondary
school. (Visco) Moratti’s solution to the age gap
between Italian and other European secondary
school graduates was to lower the age at which
children could enter elementary school. 
Unlike Berlinguer, Moratti is not sug-
gesting that a year of school be eliminated,
rather that children commence formal school-
ing at a younger age. Currently a child must be
five years and eight months to begin school;
Moratti’s reform lowers this by four months.
This seemingly insignificant, yet contested, dif-
ference would allow Italian students to gradu-
ate at the age of eighteen and a half, closer to
the European norm. 
Although this reform has been debated
and disputed, it is by no means the most con-
troversial of Moratti’s proposed reforms.
Moratti’s reign seems destined to be con-
tentious, beginning with Berlusconi’s decision
to change her official title from the Minister of
Public Education to the Minister of Education.
(“School”) Many perceive this change as
favoritism for private schools over public
schools. They also believe it is related to
Moratti’s most contested reform: her proposal
that the government should subsidize private
school tuition in order to give parents a choice
about whether their children attend public or
private schools. (“La Stampa...”)
Until Moratti’s proposal, private school
was attended by a relatively small percentage
of the school-aged population. In 1999, 93.7%
of the population of primary and secondary
school students were enrolled in public
schools; the remaining 6.3% were in private
schools. (Education at a Glance, 2001)
Although 6%–7% of students enrolled in pri-
vate schools is low compared with the 10.9%
enrolled in private schools in the United States,
Italy’s private school enrollment rate “ranks
considerably above the OECD average.”
(Checchi and Jappelli) Only 2.2% of German
primary school-aged children attend private
schools and 4.7% in Great Britain. (“Private
Enrolment...”) In 2000 private school enroll-
ment increased slightly, to 92.9% of students
in public primary schools and 7.1% in private
institutions. (“The School Reform”) 
The response to Moratti’s proposed
reform was overwhelming: “since mid-
November [2001] there have been student
strikes, marches, and even ‘occupation’ and
‘self-management’ of schools as part of their
protest strategy.” (“School”) Teachers’ unions,
school staff and students have unified their
efforts, protesting that subsidization of private
school tuition will critically injure the already
weakened public schools. Through 2003,
Moratti’s attempts to pacify the public were
futile. In December 2002, Moratti explained her
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proposed reforms during a highly publicized
conference. (“School”) Approximately 100,000
students, teachers and citizens arrived to
demonstrate against Moratti’s reforms, march-
ing throughout Rome in protest.
(“Privatization Protest”) Moratti responded to
the crowd that her reforms will “ ‘ensure that
all students receive education and training of
a comparable quality to other European Union
states.’ But opposing groups argue that, among
other things, the changes will lead to the pri-
vatization of education and the loss of thou-
sands of school-related jobs.” (“Privatization
Protest”) 
Those opposing this reform believe that
the public uproar is justified, because “the issue
is particularly topical in Italy, where the
Constitution stipulates that public and private
schools have equal rights but the latter should
not be state funded.” (Bertola and Checchi, p.
2) Some of the protests target this issue, claim-
ing that Moratti’s reform violates the Italian
constitution. “ ‘Then change the constitution,’
says M[inister] Moratti. ‘Even post-communist
constitutions like those in Croatia, Estonia,
Bulgaria and Hungary give parents choice.’ ”
(“La Stampa...”) No end to this debate is in
sight. The major unions, public school teach-
ers and students continue to protest this
reform, maintaining that school choice would
weaken the public schools and lead to further
loss of teaching jobs. Nonetheless, Moratti con-
tinues to embrace this proposed policy, saying
it is “meant to increase equality of opportuni-
ty and allow talented children of poor families
to obtain high-quality education in the private
sector.” (Bertola and Checchi, p. 3)
Moratti’s argument is supported by vari-
ous groups in Italy for many different reasons.
The private Catholic schools that make up the
vast majority of private schools in Italy are
rapidly developing problems maintaining their
enrollments. (Bertola and Checchi) “The
Constitution prohibits state support private
schools; however, declining enrollment in
Catholic schools has led Catholic Church offi-
cials, as operators of the country’s most exten-
sive network of private schools, to seek gov-
ernment aid.” (“International Religious...”)
Although the Catholic Church and the Ministry
of Education have long had a partnership,
which includes an hour of religious instruction
taught in public schools paid for by the state,
this is the first time that they have directly
asked for help with their private schools.
(“International Religious...”) Other groups,
such as the Committee on Legal Affairs and the
International Market, support Moratti’s pro-
posal for other reasons; they argue that the
“best” schools in Italy are the private institu-
tions and that by charging admission they are
preventing all students from receiving an equal
education. These citizens, teachers and parents
believe that the education system favors the
wealthy, because few others can afford to pay
for private schooling and that by providing
vouchers Moratti would make the best educa-
tion accessible to all students. (“Petition...”) 
Predicted Outcomes of the Current
Reforms
The debate over the proposed private
school funding reforms is not concluded, but
has far-reaching implications. If the state were
to provide tax relief, private school vouchers or
public funding, then the private schools would
benefit, but at the expense of the public
schools. If Moratti’s reform were implement-
ed, a much wider population would be able to
consider the option of enrolling in a private
school. Moratti’s followers zealously support
this proposed reform, stating it would provide
parents with the freedom to selectively choose
the school that is most appropriate for their
child, not just the school that they can afford.
If Moratti’s private school funding reform were
enacted, it would have dramatic implications
for the composition of all private schools in
Italy, making them available to the whole pop-
ulation, not just the upper class, and also fur-
ther reducing the student population in the
already sparsely populated public schools,
adding additional pressures to an overwrought
system. 
Because Berlinguer did establish school
parity in 2000, thereby deeming the private
schools that meet the state criteria equal to
public schools, a voucher system is not as out-
landish as it once may have seemed. Moratti
can and should use school parity to justify her
proposed system of vouchers, arguing that if
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public and private schools are to be given equal
consideration by the government, they should
be given equal funding. Using school parity to
substantiate her reform, Moratti may have
increased chances of seeing her proposals rat-
ified, but despite the parity laws, it is unlikely
that Moratti will be able to grant private
schools governmental funding because it
would violate the constitution. Moratti may be
able to institute vouchers on a small scale, but
they will never become a national program. If
Moratti’s proposal were put in place, it would
have disastrous consequences for the public
schools that would not be able to compete for
the limited number of students. However, this
never will occur; there is far too much contro-
versy and bureaucracy surrounding the pro-
posed private school funding reform. 
Based on past trends in educational
reforms, it is unlikely that any of Moratti’s
reforms, as they are currently presented, will
be enacted in Italy. Her proposed reforms are
too cumbersome and political to be accepted
en masse, so neither private school vouchers
nor the Bertagna Draft will be instituted in the
Italian educational system. Like Berlinguer
before her, Moratti will work her entire term
as Minister of Education to promote her sys-
tem of changes, only to have her reforms over-
turned by her successor. Large-scale education
reforms do not work in Italy, and nothing is
accomplished or corrected when these types of
reforms are attempted. 
Recommendations
If Moratti and the future ministers of edu-
cation would like to see their proposed changes
in effect and actually correcting the weakness-
es within the Italian system of elementary edu-
cation, they need to re-conceptualize their
reforms. It would be far better for Moratti to
focus on fixing the problems within the public
system of education instead of compounding
the problem by outsourcing education to pri-
vate institutions.
Recognizing the established patterns
within their government, Moratti and her suc-
cessors need to acknowledge that all-encom-
passing reforms will not be ratified in Italy. The
leviathan reforms that Moratti has been pro-
moting are too radical and too controversial to
be implemented in their current structure;
they will forever be bogged down in bureau-
cracy. Instead, Moratti and her successors
should focus on the crucial elements of their
reforms and work on passing these in a piece-
meal fashion. The key to successfully enacting
educational reform in Italy is the reform’s pre-
sentation. Reforms should not be offered as
massive packages, or presented as a panacea
that will solve all of the education system’s
problems. Alternatively, reforms should be pre-
sented as “small” changes targeted to fix only
one problem at a time within the system. 
It was this strategy of focusing on small
but vital changes that enabled Berlinguer to
accomplish much during his term as Minister
of Public Education. Although he was unable
to see his wide-scale reform in effect,
Berlinguer established school parity and auton-
omy because he did not present these as part
of a universal-remedy reform package. By
allowing school parity and autonomy reforms
to stand by themselves, Berlinguer was able to
accomplish what many before him could not:
change within the system of Italian education.
Conclusions
The educational climate in Italy is chang-
ing. The public has become saturated with
empty promises and impotent reforms; they are
demanding that the problems with their edu-
cation system be taken seriously and are pas-
sionately reacting to the Moratti’s proposed
reforms. The public wants change, but what
form this change should take is controversial.
The arguments over private school funding and
school entrance age will continue to rage;
meanwhile, nothing is accomplished and no
change is taking place. The much needed and
highly contested education reforms that are
currently debated in Italy will not occur unless
the government stops its internal bickering and
the ministers of education learns how to man-
age their bureaucracy. If the Italian govern-
ments continue to be transitory, if ministers of
education continue to push for whole-scale
reforms and if new governments continue to
undo the work of their precursors, then noth-
ing will ever be accomplished. 
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The public has grown apathetic and frus-
trated: “Many teachers and parents alike are
simply bewildered by the spate of often contra-
dictory reforms and tinkering over the past 30
years, and are skeptical as to whether any solu-
tion will succeed.” (Mignone and Coppa, p. 242)
The population has begun to believe that the
best any minister of education can do is tweak
the system here and there: “The talk in educa-
tional circles was of the ‘impossible reform’....
Unable to embark on any fundamental trans-
formation, successive governments merely tin-
kered with the system.” (Reviews of National...)
All this tinkering as well as the continual over-
turning of reforms has created a population
skeptical of any reform and unenthusiastic
about the education system as a whole. They
believe that despite the need in their educa-
tional system, nothing has changed and noth-
ing ever will.
Although the Italian public is losing faith
in their Ministry of Education and doubting
their ability to effect change, they should not
give up hope entirely. The passage of the
Bassanini Act and the establishment of school
parity prove that Italy’s government is not
entirely deadlocked. The Bassanini Act and the
establishment of school parity are not insignif-
icant changes to the Italian school system; they
just appear so within the scope of all the failed
reforms and often are overlooked for this same
reason. The public opinion that no significant
or drastic changes can be made to the Italian
school system is the product of decades of
impotent ministers of public education. It is
not that these ministers have not wanted or
tried to effect changes; they simply have been
unable to do so because of the complexity of the
Italian governmental system and their failure
to package reforms in a palatable size. 
Rather than attempting a total reorgani-
zation of the school system, and in doing so,
repeating the mistakes of their predecessors,
Moratti and future ministers of education
should focus their efforts on smaller but vital
pieces of their reforms. It is impossible to
enforce a comprehensive educational reform,
and if a reform does manage to get passed, it
will endure a fate similar to Berlinguer’s mas-
sive program and never come into effect. The
Italian governments are too transitory for
large-scale reforms to be implemented. Moratti
and future ministers of education must recog-
nize how their government works against all-
encompassing reforms and match their pro-
posals to function in this unique system.
All-encompassing reforms may be needed, but
never will be enacted. Moratti and her succes-
sors must tailor their reforms to their envi-
ronment, presenting them in a piecemeal fash-
ion. Working within the constraints of their
system, Italian ministers of education can
accomplish much by concentrating on imple-
menting the most crucial parts first, then, once
these are established, working bit by bit to fur-
ther their reforms until a whole-scale change
has occurred. Until they respond to the way
their government operates, until Moratti and
her successors prioritize and focus on the
important aspects of their reforms, until they
recognize that they will fail if they promote
only system-wide reform and until the public
is willing to acknowledge the benefits of piece-
meal reforms, the future of the Italian elemen-
tary education system remains uncertain. 
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